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A state’s image is an important resource for wielding national 
power in global politics. Its prestige and reputation often influence 
the interactions with other states. As an emerging superpower, 
China is under pressure to shoulder more responsibility for 
tackling global climate change. The West has criticized China as a 
“climate criminal” that threatens global climate stability. In 
response, the Chinese government implemented a series of 
comprehensive programs to improve its image abroad. This paper 
examines China’s national image building in the realm of 
international climate politics. It draws on the official rhetoric and 
policy statements to discuss the innovative strategies that China 
employed to advance its broader diplomatic agendas. By referring 
to itself as a developing country, China proclaims that it has neither 
a historical responsibility nor the resources to mitigate climate 
change, and that it desperately needs the financial and 
technological support from the West. By employing the rhetoric of 
being a peace-loving and harmonious nation, China has begun to 
address the problems of global climate change, even though it 
refuses to submit to any binding emission reduction targets in the 
negotiations over a post-Kyoto international climate agreement.  
 
Author’s Bio  
Sanna Kopra earned her M.A. in international relations from the 
University of Lapland, Finland in 2010. She is currently a Ph.D. 
candidate at the University of Tampere, Finland. Her doctoral 
research focuses on China’s climate change diplomacy from the 




Is China a Responsible Developing Country? 
1 
 
Is China a Responsible Developing Country?  
Climate Change Diplomacy and  







China has played an important but contradictory role in 
international climate change politics. On the one hand, China is a 
developing country where millions of people still live in poverty; 
on the other hand, with the intensive use of coal, it has become the 
world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2). The continuation 
of the business-as-usual policy in China would lead to a rise of 
2.7°C in global temperatures by 2050, even if all the countries in 
the world achieved an 80% reduction in their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (Watts, June 9, 2009). According to Richard N. 
Cooper (2008: 4–10), China’s total demand for energy grows by 
4.1% annually until 2025, and this makes up 12% of the world’s oil 
consumption and 39% of the world’s coal consumption. 
Furthermore, China’s CO2 emissions grow by 4% every year, even 
though its energy efficiency improves by 1.9% annually until 2025 
and its greenhouse gas emissions per citizen are lower than those 
of the developed world. In 2009, the CO2 emissions per capita 
were 5.13 tons in China, 7.54 tons in the United Kingdom, and 16.9 
tons in the United States (International Energy Agency, 2011). 
 
∗ I want to thank the Niilo Helander Foundation for funding the 
research for this article.    
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As China rises to power in the twenty-first century, there is a 
growing body of literature on its foreign policy. Many analysts 
perceive China as “harmful, destabilizing, and even pernicious,” 
threatening international order (Deng, 2006: 186). China has 
dismissed such criticisms and redoubled the efforts to improve its 
international status “as it were the most desirable value, the one 
that leads to power, security, and respect” (Deng, 2008: 8). Peter 
Hays Gries (2005: 103–105) explains that nationalism is “designed 
to restore, maintain, or advance public images of the nation,” and 
it serves as “a key–if not the key–motivator of Chinese foreign 
policy.” The Communist leaders often refer to the so-called 
century of national humiliation (1839-1949) in which the West 
undermined China as the world’s most sophisticated civilization, 
and call for the need to reconstruct the Chinese identity against the 
West and to restore the country’s prestige. 
For years, the developed countries have called China a 
“climate criminal” that threatens global climate stability. They 
complain that the priorities of China’s environmental diplomacy 
are to “protect its sovereignty, acquire foreign aid and technical 
assistance, and promote its economic development” (Harris, 2005: 
24). After the U.N. Copenhagen Conference in 2009, China was 
accused of “blocking the progress” on climate and environmental 
protection, even though the United States has done little to 
address the issue (Lynas, December 22, 2009; Vidal, December 20, 
2009). It took a long time before China admitted being the world’s 
largest CO2 emitter. After the Copenhagen Conference, China 
sought to improve its status abroad, but most conventional studies 
have overlooked China’s attempt at national image building.   
This article argues that China’s pursuit for a respectable 
image is at the center of its climate change diplomacy. Through a 
critical analysis of the Chinese policy statements, this study shows 
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that the government deliberately presents itself “as a peace loving, 
responsible actor” and “as a poor developing country.” Both 
discourses are designed to accomplish the broader diplomatic 
agendas. The rhetoric of being “a responsible actor” enables China 
to raise its international profile and pursue its interests more easily; 
and that of being “a poor developing country” underlines its need 
for foreign assistance. These discourses justify China’s decision to 
reject any binding CO2 emission reduction targets in the 
negotiations over a post-Kyoto climate agreement.  
 
 
2. China’s National Image Building 
A state’s image is an important resource for wielding national 
power in global politics. During the Cold War, the realistic school 
of international relations emphasized the pursuit of prestige, 
image, and reputation in order to win the balance of power. In the 
1960s, Hans J. Morgenthau stated that the national image or “the 
mental picture–that is, our prestige” “determinates what we are as 
members of society.” Individuals and states seek to be reputable 
because “in the struggle for existence and power…what others 
think about us is as important as what we actually are.” Hence, a 
“policy of prestige” is “an indispensable element of a rational 
foreign policy; states strive to impress other nations with the 
power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it 
believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses” 
(Morgenthau, 1993: 84–93). Similarly, Daniel J. Boorstin explains 
that prestige is determined by the others’ respect for one’s image:  
 
When we talk of prestige abroad, we are talking not of 
ourselves, but of the shadows of ourselves which we can 
somehow project. To compare prestige, then, is to compare 
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the appeal of images. To insist on our prestige is to insist on 
the appeal of our image (Boorstin, 1977: 247). 
  
Both Morgenthau and Boorstin agree that one’s prestige 
determinates one’s role in society. In order to gain prestige, we try 
to improve our image rather than ourselves because we “live in 
our world of illusions” (Boorstin, 1977: 249). Robert Jervis (1970) 
applies this principle to the study of international relations and 
shows that as rational actors, modern states continue to project 
their desired images to achieve political objectives. Jervis defines 
an actor as “those of his beliefs about the other that affect his 
predictions of how the other will behave under various 
circumstances.” The image of a state often influences the 
interactions with other states. A good image generates trust and 
cooperation, whereas a bad one provokes hostile reactions and 
undermines the state’s security. Therefore, the image of a state is a 
key factor determining “whether and how easily the state can 
reach its goals”—perhaps even more significant than the 
expansion of military and economic power (Jervis, 1970: 5–8).  
Building up a favorable image is essential for attaining a 
competitive ranking in the world because some states rank better 
than the others. If only one country existed in the world, it would 
not concern about its image. Because of the interstate competition, 
national image building is critical to national security. According 
to the realists of politics, the image of a state can wield an 
important degree of deterrence. Niccolò Machiavelli argued 
centuries ago that if a state had a reputation of strength and power, 
other states would not dare to challenge or lie to it (Machiavelli, 
1988: 64). By drawing on the concept of national image building to 
analyze China’s climate change diplomacy, this article 
acknowledges the limitations of realism in global politics. For 
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example, hard factors such as economic and military power play a 
less important role in the image building process. As the world is 
becoming more interdependent than before, many states seek to 
present themselves as responsible, cooperative, and credible 
members of the global community. The cost of non-credibility is 
incalculable, and credibility–“to be believed–is a significant source 
of attraction and soft power” (Nye Jr., 2004: 31). The image of 
states often determines the level of soft power that they have, and 
states can easily increase their global influence by making 
themselves more appealing to the world (Koski, 2005).  
In the Chinese context, the concept of face refers to human 
concerns over honor and respect. As Peter Hays Gries (2004: 24) 
explains, face is “fundamentally political, involving a contest over 
power,” and the respect for China’s national face in the 
international arena is an important motivator of the Chinese 
foreign policy. Keeping face means “maintaining authority” and 
the state’s national honor; losing face means “losing status and the 
ability to pursue instrumental goals” (Ibid., 29). The Chinese can 
“give face” (liu mianzi) to one another in order to maintain 
interpersonal harmony. The government does the likewise and 
insists on other countries to treat it as an equal. Since the 1990s, 
China has “gradually realized the importance of setting up a 
positive image in its relations with the outside world” (Jing, 2007: 
25). According to Wang Hongying (2005), the post-Maoist state has 
projected an image “as an international co-operator” in global 
economy and politics. At present, there is a “scholarly consensus 
that the Chinese foreign policy has countered its negative 
reputation through a commitment to building a cooperative, 
responsible image in international society” (Deng, 2006: 186). The 
study of China’s image building should throw light on the 
complexity of the state’s diplomatic behaviors. Wang Hongying 
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(2005: 89–92) identifies four types of image-behavior relationships. 
First, there is “a big cap between China’s projected images and its 
foreign policy behavior” because images and behavior often have 
little in common. Second, China’s projected images do not have 
any causal effect on foreign policy behavior, but these images help 
to justify the government’s policies at home and abroad. Third, the 
government “may calculatingly engage in foreign policy behavior 
according to its projected images to give credibility to the latter.” 
Fourth, the government “may unthinkingly choose its foreign 
policies according to its projected images because these images 
indeed reflect the leadership’s conception of China’s role in 
international affairs.” Many international actors are aware of 
China’s obsession with image building, and they are keen to 
encourage China to become a cooperative and responsible player.  
 
 
3. China as a Peace-loving and Responsible Actor  
China has actively participated in the international negotiations on 
climate change. As China announced in its Climate Change White 
Paper, it made a “significant contribution to addressing global 
climate change.” Moreover, China always emphasized its “key 
role in breaking the negotiation deadlock and promoting 
consensus among all the parties” in the Copenhagen Conference. It 
highlighted Hu Jintao’s call for consensus over the climate change 
negotiation and Wen Jiabao’s “outstanding contributions” to the 
Copenhagen Conference (Information Office of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). At the 2011 Durban 
Climate Change Conference, China installed its first pavilion, 
indicating its determination to tackle climate change and global 
warming (The People’s Daily, December 5, 2011). Since 2004, the 
rhetoric of “peaceful development” has become an integral part of 
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the Chinese diplomacy. China renounced the pursuit of hegemony 
and opposed external intervention into the internal affairs of 
another country. Instead of adhering to the Cold War ideology of 
zero-sum security based on military force, China has emphasized 
the importance of “win-win” security and progress in global 
politics (Shirk, 2007: 129). It pledges to strengthen international 
cooperation based on mutual trust and mutual benefit so that all 
the partners can win. The win-win rhetoric suggests that China’s 
economic rise does not threaten other states, but instead offers 
them great business opportunities. As Hu Jintao (2008) stated, “We 
should foster the idea that helping others is helping oneself and 
make our endeavor on climate change a win-win for both 
developed and developing countries and a win-win for both the 
interests of individual countries and the common interests of 
humanity.” He (2008) continued, “China is ready to work 
unremittingly with the rest of the international community to 
achieve harmonious, clean and sustainable development in the 
world.” 
Ideologically, pragmatism has dictated China’s strategic 
thinking (Lee, Nedilsky, and Cheung, eds., 2012). The government 
have doubled up the efforts to “replace socialist ideas and absorb 
Confucianism as a dominant ideology” (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 471). 
It no longer speaks of Marxism and Communism which are the 
hyponyms of totalitarianism (Fairclough, 1989: 116). Currently, 
China seeks to soften its global image, to cultivate its soft power, 
and to reduce the fear of the “China threat” by highlighting its 
benevolent Confucianism as a source of political inspiration. In 
diplomacy, China has drawn on the Confucian values and 
terminologies to “project a pacifist cultural image” (Cao, 2007: 436). 
For instance, the government launched the lexicon of “harmonious 
world” at the United Nations Summit in 2005 (Ding, 2008: 193). 
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The government equally reiterates the lexicon of harmony in the 
international climate policy negotiations. By using metaphors with 
positive connotations, it sets out to consolidate solidarity and 
togetherness with the developing world. “Our homeland” and 
“Mother Earth” in particular can be interpreted by the global 
community as universal values that “play an important role in 
argumentation because they allow us to present specific values, 
those upon which specific groups reach agreement, as more 
determined aspects of these universal values” (Perelman, 1982: 26–
27). These wordings can be seen in many official announcements: 
“China’s policies, measures, and actions to combat climate change, 
demonstrate the country’s sense of responsibility for the survival 
and development of mankind and the future of our Mother Earth” 
(Delegation of China, 2009). “The international community must 
act in accordance with the principles and provisions of the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It must recognize that helping 
others is helping oneself and harming others is harming oneself, 
actively tackle climate change, and work together to make our 
homeland a better place” (Wen Jiabao, 2008). 
In the early 1990s, Joseph Nye Jr. introduced the concept of 
soft power (i.e., the ability to get what one wants through 
attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and dominance) to 
conceptualize the complexity of post-Cold War politics. In fact, the 
ancient Chinese philosophers had long identified consensus as a 
key to survival and development. The contemporary concept of 
soft power is too American-centric because the American values 
and practices are being seen as global while they are not. On the 
surface, the Chinese political ideals do not match the American 
ones such as human rights, democracy, and freedom. China, 
however, has appealed to many countries with its own version of 
soft power, focusing on “economic benefits, shared norms and 
Is China a Responsible Developing Country? 
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values, cooperation on non-traditional issues, infatuation with new 
China, the mutual benefits of tourism and education, diplomacy 
and style, and networking and reciprocal obligations within ethnic 
Chinese communities.” In contrast to the American soft power, 
China’s soft power is inclusive and interactive because it “derives 
from Beijing’s courtship and what regional neighbors perceive as 
mutual benefits” (Percival, 2007: 111–113). One irresistible 
attraction of China’s modernization is the model of state-
controlled economic development, and some academics have 
promoted the Beijing Consensus as an alternative to the 
Washington Consensus (Ramo, 2004).  
As China rises to power, it has the political will and 
resources to address a wider range of diplomatic issues. In the last 
two decades, China generated much goodwill by offering loans, 
grants, debt relief, conventional weapons, scholarships, and 
infrastructural investments to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin 
America. On global climate change, China identifies with the 
developing world and expresses its willingness to help the poor 
countries to “improve their capability to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change” (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011). As Xie Zhenhua (2010) stated, 
“China has strong sympathy for the negative impacts of climate 
change faced by lesser developed countries, small island countries, 
African countries and other developing countries.” Christine 
Beuermann (1997: 220) comments that the “issue of climate change 
is regarded as an opportunity to demonstrate and defend China’s 
claim and self-perception as a major player in world politics and to 
be leader of and speaker for developing countries.” By portraying 
itself as the victim of Western colonialism, China succeeded in 
differentiating itself from the West and gaining much support in 
the developing world. This rhetoric enabled China to become an 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.13 
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“old and true friend of the African people,” even though the 
“friendship with various dictators” may undermine its prestige in 
the West (Ding, 2008: 201–202). Because China never holds good 
governance as a precondition for offering aid, the developed 
world worries that China’s increasing presence in Africa would 
obstruct the growth of civil society.  
China has framed climate change as a global challenge that 
can be solved by “extensive international cooperation” between 
the developed and developing world (Information Office of the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). The 
Communist leaders have made “full use of the United Nations’ 
General Assembly” and other multilateral institutions to bargain 
with the United States and the European Union. China has not 
only become an active member in all multilateral bodies but also 
created new regional forums such as the ASEAN Plus Three and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to advance its agendas. 
While in favor of the regional and sectional climate cooperation, 
China often refers to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol as the “most 
authoritative, universal, and comprehensive international 
framework for coping with climate change” (Information Office of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). All 
other informal consultations are “supplements to rather than 
substitutes for the negotiation process of the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol” which provide “the basic framework and legal 
foundation of international cooperation for addressing climate 
change” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011). China’s decision to uphold the U.N. 
system is a pragmatic one. It endorses the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” that would exempt China from 
meeting the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.  
Is China a Responsible Developing Country? 
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China’s participation in the multilateral dialogues has been 
shown to be an indicative of its integration into the global society. 
Thomas C. Schelling (1966: 150) argues that actions are important 
pieces of evidence of one’s political commitment and credibility, 
whereas “words are cheap and not inherently credible.” Similarly, 
Chaïm Perelman (1982: 93) asserts that “past acts contribute to the 
good or bad reputation of the agent,” and that argumentation by 
giving examples is “to presuppose the existence of certain 
regularities of which the examples provide concretization.” 
Presenting only one example is not always convincing, but if a 
speaker gives “a number of examples of the same sort,” the 
argumentation may “move from the specific case toward a 
generalization.” Therefore, a series of examples convince the 
audience about the speaker’s argumentation (Ibid., 106). This is 
particularly true for China, which has implemented numerous 
policies to mitigate climate change, and has reduced the amount of 
CO2 emissions at home. According to Su Wei of the Director-
General Office of China’s National Leading Group on Climate 
Change (2007), “China is ACTING. We will do what we should do 
and will do what we can do. We don’t care much for the 
recognition of what we’ve done. All we care for is the wellbeing 
and the future of mankind.” Premier Wen also stated (2009), “The 
Chinese government has set the target for mitigating greenhouse 
gas emissions. This is a voluntary action China has taken in light 
of its national circumstances. We have not attached any condition 
to the target, nor have we linked it to the target of any other 
country. We will honor our word with real action.” These remarks 
reflect the growing sense of confidence among the Chinese leaders 
in the debate on climate change. 
As with many countries, China prefers non-binding 
guidelines to binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.13 
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Before the Durban Conference in 2011, China proposed voluntary 
national objectives, but in Durban, China set five conditions for 
accepting a legally binding international treaty on climate change 
after 2020. These conditions included: first, rich nations pledge to 
enforce new carbon-cutting targets in the second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol; second, the world launches the 
Green Climate Fund as they had agreed in Cancun under a 
supervisory regime; third, all countries implement the consensus 
of adaptation; fourth, rich nations transfer environmental 
technology to developing countries; and fifth, there is a guarantee 
of transparency and capability building in the greenhouse gas 
emission reduction treaty (The China Daily, December 6, 2011). On 
the surface, China’s announcement reflected its new commitment 
to tackling climate change. But China’s conditions were so rigid 
that left no room for negotiation. As Donald Bailey (December 6, 
2011) comments, “China’s current position actually remains pretty 
much what it has always been: It will accept legally binding limits 
on its greenhouse gas emissions when Hell freezes over.” 
Despite its rejection of an international climate change treaty, 
China has taken major steps to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Chinese climate policy is linked to its energy policy. 
A sufficient energy supply is vital for sustaining China’s economic 
growth, which is fuelled by energy-intensive heavy industry. In 
the past, the government only focused on energy supply, but it has 
developed new hydropower and nuclear power reactors to reduce 
its dependence on imported fossil fuels. Since 2009, China has 
become the world’s leading investor in renewable energy (The 
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010). The share of renewable energy rose 
from 8.4% in 2010 to 11.4% in 2011 (Nichols, 2012). In 2003, the 
government set out to reduce energy demand through energy 
conservation. It closed ineffective power plants and factories, 
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promoted the use of energy-saving products, and established new 
standards to reduce automotive pollution. The government has set 
ambitious goals on energy efficiency. In the 12th Five-Year 
Program (2011—2015), it pledges to cut energy consumption per 
unit of gross domestic product by 16% and CO2 emissions by 17% 
by 2015 (Chen, March 28, 2011).  
To date, China has avoided the hazardous growth of 
greenhouse gas emissions because its overall energy efficiency has 
improved since 1980 (Gallagher, 2007). The energy conservation 
programs, however, only achieve a relative cut in the CO2 
emissions per unit of gross domestic product. There is no overall 
reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions because economic 
growth and rising energy consumption are the reasons for 
constructing more coal plants. Over half of China’s primary 
energy consumption still relies on coal (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2007: 63). By 2030, China’s greenhouse gas emissions 
will be 400% above its 1990 level (Jakobson, 2009: 39). China’s 
Science and Technology Minister unofficially announced that the 
carbon emissions peak “would definitely come between 2030 and 
2040.” Many scholars estimate China’s carbon emissions to peak 
between 2020 and 2050 (Watts, December 6, 2009). In addition, the 
ultimate reason for prioritizing renewable energy is to cut the cost 
of energy production and to gain energy security. The 11th Five-
Year Plan (2006-2010) pledged to address “the impacts of energy 
shortages on the economy and the country’s rising dependency on 
external energy sources” (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2008: 311-312). 
Even though energy security and economic development take 
precedence over the concern for climate protection, the Chinese 
leaders are moving in the right direction. Nevertheless, many 
developed countries are skeptical of the efficacy of China’s 
greenhouse gas emission reduction plans because there is no 
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compliance enforcement. They continue to urge China, the world’s 
highest CO2 emitter, to adhere to a binding agreement in order to 
tackle climate change.  
  
 
4. China as a Poor Developing Country 
Despite its economic boom, China is classified as a developing 
country. As many as 128 million rural inhabitants live under the 
official poverty line of US$1.25 a day. The central government sees 
it necessary to “complete the historical task of industrialization 
and urbanization” (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011). In formulating its discourse of 
climate change, China underlines its status as a poor country and 
reminds the developed world that its national development is a 
formidable task (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2008). As economic growth is of 
decisive importance, the government is unwilling to take dramatic 
actions that would raise the cost of doing business in China. 
Otherwise, the foreign investors would move to countries with 
cheaper labor and less strict climate standards.  
Global climate change, however, has threatened China’s 
ecological system and its socioeconomic development. In financial 
terms, Nicholas Stern (2006: 106) estimates that from 1988 to 2004, 
“China experienced economic losses from drought and flood 
equating to 1.2% and 0.8% of GDP, respectively.” J. Timmons 
Roberts and Bradley C. Parks (2007) draw attention to the number 
of people killed, made homeless, or otherwise damaged by 
climate-related disasters such as floods, heat waves, droughts, and 
windstorms. From 1980 to 2002, 45,000 people were killed and fifty 
million became homeless in climate-related disasters (Roberts and 
Parks, 2007: 76). It is difficult to assess the extent to which global 
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climate change led to many previous natural disasters. But many 
Chinese are still living in areas vulnerable to climate-related risks, 
and the frequency and intensity of disasters will continue to rise. 
Scientific findings suggest that climate patterns are changing in 
China: the average surface temperature increased between 0.5°C 
and 0.8°C in the twentieth century; the mountain glaciers are 
melting at an accelerated rate; the intensity of heat waves becomes 
severe in many provinces in the north; and there is a heavy 
precipitation in the south. Many inland lakes and rivers have dried 
up due to the rapid economic and population growth. Serious 
water shortages will lead to a fall in agricultural output, raising 
alarm about food security (National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2007). At least 150 million people need to be 
relocated due to climate change (Watts, May 18, 2009). 
China is aware of the devastating impacts of global climate 
change, and has criticized the West for imposing a greenhouse gas 
emission reduction agreement on the world. As Wen Jiabao (2008) 
pointed out, “If we look at the world history of development, we 
will see that developed countries encountered their resource and 
environmental challenges during the course of 200 years of 
industrialization. But we are confronted with the challenges at the 
same time. In addition, we have to address in a much shorter time 
frame the issue of energy conservation and pollution control 
which has taken the developed countries decades to tackle after 
they became highly developed. The difficulties we face are 
therefore unprecedented.” China has aligned itself with the G77 
group in climate change debates. Seeing environmental protection 
as compatible with poverty eradication, China demands all climate 
change actions to be in line with the United Nations Millennium 
Goals. By framing climate change as a development issue, China 
insists that technological solutions are the key to the success of 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.13 
16 
 
climate protection. China still needs the financial and technological 
support of the West but it does not intend to seek assistance 
explicitly. Rhetorically, China finds it more feasible to speak of the 
needs of all developing nations as a group rather than its own 
interests. For example, Hu Jintao (2008) called on the developed 
countries “to attain the goal of emission reduction defined in the 
[Kyoto] Protocol and take concrete measures to honor their 
commitments of providing funding and technology transfer to 
developing countries.” Similarly, Liu Zhenmin (2007) asserts that 
“the key to addressing climate change lies with technological 
progress and with the establishment of production and 
consumption patterns that meet the requirements of sustainable 
development. The experience of various countries shows that 
technology is decisive in mitigating and adapting to climate 
change.” The West cannot deny the developing world’s request for 
assistance. If the former agrees to transfer funding and technology 
to the latter, China will definitely benefit.  
The characterization of China as “the largest developing 
country in the world” may not be accurate. Since the developing 
countries are not a homogenous group and have little in common, 
the West proposes these countries (non-Annex I countries) to 
regroup themselves in the future. China publicly opposes this 
proposal because of its refusal to follow any legally binding 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Furthermore, there are 
no sub-categories between developed and developing nations for 
China, and this would weaken its diplomatic position in the 
international climate negotiations. China does not want to be left 
alone in the negotiations and therefore, in addition to its alliance 
with the G77, it strengthens cooperation amongst the BASIC (i.e., 
Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries. The BASIC 
countries have played an increasingly important role in global 
Is China a Responsible Developing Country? 
17 
 
politics. In 2007, the BASIC collectively accounted for 
approximately 40% of the world’s population, and 29% of the 
world’s overall GHG emissions, of which China’s share was about 
17% (Hallding et al., 2011: 32). Despite the group’s internal 
differences such as the level of industrialization and that of CO2 
emissions per capita, the BASIC formed an alliance against any 
binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Brazil and 
South Africa, however, have “indicated an openness to the idea” 
of negotiating a binding climate change agreement (Ibid., 93).  
Because China is still conditioned by the psychological 
burden of the century of shame, it sees itself a powerless country 
incapable of tackling the unprecedented climate change. The 
government acknowledges the problem of its greenhouse gas 
emissions, but it defends itself by separating the subsistence 
emissions of the poor from the luxury emissions of the rich. The 
luxury emissions of rich countries are excessive and should be 
restricted, whereas the “subsistence emissions” of developing 
countries are the matter of life and death. China has created new 
vocabularies to frame the climate change discussion.  
Given its export-driven development strategy, China has not 
only become the “world’s factory, but also its smokestack” (Kahn 
and Landler, December 21, 2007). A significant proportion of its 
CO2 emissions are actually “offshore emissions” and the Western 
consumers should be responsible for the increase of GHG 
emissions in China. For instance, 23% of China’s CO2 emissions 
are caused by manufacturing goods exported to the West (Wang 
and Watson, 2007), and half of its increase results from the 
production of electronics, metals, chemicals, and textile goods 
(Guan et al., 2009). As the West outsourced their factories and CO2 
emissions to “pollution heavens” like China, this economic 
restructuring has reduced the level of pollution at home. For 
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example, after moving its factories to China, Germany has reduced 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 19% yearly since 1990 (Kahn and 
Landler, December 21, 2007). If one takes into account this 
structural factor, one should not blame China for being the world’s 
largest CO2 emitter. Instead, it is necessary to reform the current 
system of international climate politics that only penalizes those 
poor workers in the developing world rather than rich consumers 
in the developed nations. The post-Kyoto negotiations should face 
the challenge of reducing the scale of consumption rather than that 
of greenhouse gas emissions in the production process. 
 
 
5. Discussion  
The Chinese engagement in the realm of global climate politics 
makes itself “a nation with a dual-identity” (Wu, 2001: 293). On 
the one hand, the government emphasizes the state’s role as a 
“peace loving, responsible actor.” This discourse suggests that as a 
credible and benevolent member of the international community, 
China has taken the issue of climate change seriously. On the other 
hand, China calls itself a “developing country” and a victim of 
global climate change. Therefore, it should receive the financial 
and technological support of the West to deal with the problem. 
This dualist nature is a key to understanding the Chinese climate 
change diplomacy. In general, China has become “more proactive, 
more engaged, and more flexible” in the international negotiations 
since the Bali Conference in 2008 (Liang, 2010: 68). Unlike the 
United States and Canada that withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Chinese participation in climate change dialogues has not only 
improved its image but also made the call for multilateralism more 
appealing to the world.  
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Seen from this perspective, some commentators have urged 
China to replace its sense of victimhood with that of normal 
mentality on an international stage (Deng, 2005: 60). China can 
hardly justify itself as a developing country because of the 
economic boom. With the extravagance of the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, it is difficult to convince foreigners that China is a poor 
nation in need of financial assistance (Jakonson, 2009: 26). Hence, 
China should abandon the discourse of dualism and support the 
regrouping of the non-Annex I countries. In so doing, China could 
strengthen its image as a credible global power. So far, the BASIC 
group has provided China with a platform to advance its 
diplomatic agendas and to push “a hard line as a collective rather 
than an individual” member-state (Hallding et al., 2011: 76). As the 
world’s second largest economy and a rising power, China should 
set the climate change agenda amongst the BASIC countries.  
Without the commitment and support of the developed 
nations, however, the BASIC group has to appropriate the sense of 
victimhood as a bargaining power. Unless the developed countries 
change their position and provide assistance to the developing 
world, China has difficulty living up to its projected image as a 
responsible actor. According to Sarah Raine (2009), the West has to 
keep reminding China of the respect for democracy, good 
governance, and the rule of law. “If they do so consistently and 
fairly, this is likely to impact China’s thinking.” While China 
worries about the global opinion, “it will balance this listening 
with watching what others do.” Instead, the West should set a 
model for China by doing their share in global climate protection 
and by coordinating with the developing world. To date, the 
Chinese leaders remain frustrated with the West because the latter 
seldom appreciates the environmental progress of China.  
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Nevertheless, China is keen to maintain its favorable image 
as a cooperative partner of the international community. The fear 
of losing face may constrain its behaviors. As China wants to be 
treated as a responsible stakeholder, its climate change policy is 
partially shaped by the international pressure. Besides these 
external factors, China is under strong domestic pressures to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. After all, environmental 
protection and energy security are not exclusive to one another. 
Both issues are essential for sustaining economic growth and 
reducing social discontent. China has expressed its willingness to 
meet the absolute greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in the 
future as long as the West pledges to provide assistance. Evidently, 
China and the West have yet to work together to address global 
climate change.  
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